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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
ETHEL FORREST
Plaintiff and .Appellant

-vs.GEORGE E. · EASON, BETH
EASON, his wife, GEORGE A. WILSON, MYRTLE R. WILSON, his
wife, doing business of UT.AH D·RUGLESS HEALTH CLINIC

Case No. 7891

Defendants and Respondents

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff brought this action against all of these defendants, alleging that defendants were associated to.;
gether in the op·eration of a business known as the Utah
Drugless Health Clinic and that said defendants acting
through defendant, George E. Eason, a duly licensed
naturopathic physician, entered into an agreement with
plaintiff for a diagnosis and treatment of her illness.
It was furthe~r alleged that defendants negligently, un- .
skillfully and without ordinary care, skill and knowledge~
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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illegally injected into plaintiff various fluids and that on
December 27, 1950, did inject a liquid into plaintiff's
body which caused plaintiff to suffer a convulsion with
the result of cerebral vascular accident.
The case was tried before a jury and at the conclusion of plaintiff's case a verdict was directed against the
plaintiff upon the ground that the plaintiff had failed to
show any negligent act or omission on the part of defendants which was a proximate cause of any injury plaintiff
may have suffered.
FACTS
While the appellant does not raise the point in her
brief, it may be well to dispose of the liability of the defendants, other than George Eason, before discussing the
other evidence in the case. There was no eviden~e that any
of the defendants, except George A. Wilson and George
Eason, had ever had any connection with the Utah Drugless Health Clinic. George A. Wilson and George Eason
had at one time been partners, but that relationship was
· terminated two years prior to the trial ( R. 50) on November 1 and 2, 1951 (R. 8) or during the fall of 1949 which
was prior to the time plaintiff entered into any agreement
for treatment (R. 2);. Doctor Wilson had no control over
the business, did not re:eeive any part of the income, and
did not treat plaintiff or consuTt with defendant, Dr.
Eason, on her treatment (R. 66). There appearing to be no
question that none of the defendants, other than George
Eason, had any conneetion with the case, we shall
adopt the~ style of appellant and use the word defendant
to refer to George Eason (Appellant's Brief, page 2).
2
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The plaintiff, Ethel Forrest, was a woman 62 years
of age at the time of the trial (R. 96), twice married,
the second time to a Inan named Johnson (R. 129). Her
last employment 'vas in the capacity of a cleaning lady at
the Kearns Building where she was employed for six
years (R. 96-97). She had an arthritic condition for about
4 years as far as she knows (R. 130). In Ap·ril of 1949
the condition became so severe that she had to quit work
at the Kearns Building (R. 98-130). From that time to
the time of trial she had no:t secured other employment.
She apparently discussed her condition with a William Lloyd who recommended Dr. Eason to her (R. 101).
In response to a call from plaintiff's sister, a Mrs.
Wright, defendant visited plaintiff at her home on
August 3, 1950. Defendant diagnosed her condition as
arthritis (R. 21-102) and an agreement was made for
treatments to start August 4, 19·50 at" Dr. Eason's office.
On August 4, 1950 plaintiff report_ed to defendant's office.
The treatment consisted of manipulation and diathermy,
instructions on diet and vvays she might help herself at
home (R. 22). This san1e treatment was continued on
subsequent visits during the month of August with a ·
little vitamin B1 being given to plaintiff (R. 27).
During the lllOnth of s.eptember, diathermy and manipulation treatments were continue·d and sine wave and
galvanic wave treatments, an electrotherapy treatment,
were given in the vicinity of the knees (R. 29). Treat•nent continued on through October, November and De<'einber with injections of penicillin being given on October 2, 4 and 6 (R. 35). On November 8, 10 and 13,

3
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procaine .hydrochloride injections were given (R. 37). On
'Novemb~r 17, 24, 27 and 30 and December 4 and 7,
desoxycorticosterone injections were given (R. 36). On
D·ecember 11, 14, 18, 21 and 27, vitamin Bl injections were
given. From December 11 to 27, 1950, the only injections
given were vitamin B1 (R. 37).
·The ·c:ab driver, Chris Michaels, who drove a Ute
Cab and had taken pl~intiff to defendant's office on many
occasions, testified that plaintiff was a crippled lady and
required assistance on each occasion. He stated that
wheri he took plaintiff home from defendant's office on
December 27, 1950 she was coherent and rational and that
there was nothing unusual or different about her condition on this occasion as compared with her condition on
previous trips· '(R. 144-145).
On cross examination Dr. Eason testified that vitamin B1 was injected into the muscular part of the body,
and was given to relax the system and to build the system
in order to overcome the arthritic condition (R. 67).
A galvanic treatment is an e~lectric treatment given to
relieve tension in the muscles and in the blood vessels
and joints (R. 67). The procaine hydrochloride. solution
is used to release tension in blood vessels and is injected
into the· vein. The desoxycorticosterone or percorten is
given with vitamin C to build the system. It is a glandular substance used instead of crotisone and ACTH, the
cost of which would he -prohibitive. to a person of plaintiff's means (R. 69). All the tr·eatments given were accepted p·rocedure or. treatment for arthritis at the time it
was given (R. 68-70) and there is no evidence in the
record to the contrary.
4
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The appellant in her argument makes much of the
manner of giving injections and it is perhaps wise to review the evidence in that regard~ Dr. Eason testified
the only time any difficulty was encountered. was on
November 6 when when he 'vas giving an intravenous
8hot and had difficulty in getting in to the vein of left
arm and so went over to the other arm (R. 45). Dr.
Eason testified that this is ·a quite common occurrence.
Plaintiff's testimony in this regard is that sometime in
November Dr. Eason had to switch over to the right arm
(R. 109). That her ann was black and blue and swollen,
but that it healed in a couple of weeks (R. 110). Plaintiff
testified that the doctor did not have any difficulty after
he started making injections in the right arm (R. 111).
There is a conflict of .testimony as to how many injections were given on the last day, December 27, 1950.
Dr. Eason testified that he gave her one. injection of B1
on that date (R. 70) ~ Plaintiff testifies to two injections,
one in the buttocks and one in the right arm (R. 114-115116). The arm which she had previously t~stified Dr.
Eason had had no difficulty with in rnaking an injection.
The day after New Year's Day in 1951, on January
2, plaintiff suffered a S'erious convulsion and lapsed into
an unconscious state (R. 185-186). Dr. J. Edward Day,
·who has his office in the Judge Building at Salt Lake
City, was called in, he stated he was given a history of
the case by p]aintiff's sister (R. 188) and that as he
studied the case her condition might.be due to ap~oplexy;
a blood clot, an infarct breaking loose; a trauma due to
h~·pPrtension which would· cause a contraction of the
5
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

vessels of the brain ... but the emboli of the bacteriemia
n'a.ture or a soluble nature that reached the blood stream
into the brain was probably the cause; and on examination of the patient, he had seen these marks of injection
and awhether they were or not, they were said to be penicillin shots, some of them, and tha.t it. is possible that the
oil in the penicillin could reach the vein and possibly
through the vein or through the lwng into the circulation
and the brain. So it was my impre~ssion that it was an
emboli due to bacteriemia or some soluble subst(JJI'IJce that
could be injected into the· system, either by bacteria, dirty
needle, or oil or some~thing of that nature that could reach
t~e circulation through the lung." (R. 194).
Dr. Day defined an emboli a.s: "Well, an emboli is a
portion or particle that reaches the circul'ation and is
deposited at some foreign point; could be of the lung;
could be of the brain; could be of the heart; could be anywhere, hut it is a point ... could be blood; could be bacteriemia; could he oil; could be fat; could be, anything
that you might speak ·of as a small portion that was inje'Cted or broken off from some part of the body and
reaches the blood stream and finally finds a resting place
in other parts of the body." (R. 195).
The plaintiff was not hospitalized and apparently
has fully recovered from the effects of the convulsion,
the testimony being that her condition at the time of
trial was better than it had been at the time the defendant
had first se,en her (R. 40).
There is considerable evidence going to plaintiff'R
condition before, during and after the treatments given
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to her by defendant. . A_ consideration of this evidence
is not necessary to our discussion here. Suffice it to say
that an exa1uination of the record reveals that the defendant \vas seriously impaired because of the arthritic condition and required assistance fron1 a period before thPtreatments were started and that that condition continued
up to the time of trial. Other pertinent evidence will be
discussed in connection \vith the argument.

STATEniENT OF POINTS
POINT NO. I. THE STANDARD OF CARE AND SKILL
REQUIRED OF THE DEFENDANT MUST NECESSARILY
DEPEND UPON EXPERT TESTIMONY.
POINT NO. II. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF LACK OF
SKILL OR NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE DEFENDANT.
POINT NO. III. THERE IS NO SHOWING THAT THE
PLAINTIFF'S CONDITION WAS PROXIMATELY CAUSED
BY ANY ACT OR OMISSION OF DEFENDANT, NEGLIGENT
OR OTHERWISE.
POINT NO. IV. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN SUSTAINING ANY OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S QUESTIONS.

ARGUMENT
POINT NO. I. THE STANDARD OF CARE AND SKILL
REQUIRED OF THE DEFENDANT MUST NECESSARILY
DEPEND UPON EXPERT TESTIMONY.

The plaintiff prior to going to defendant was suffering from a condition of arthritis. It is· claimed that the
plaintiff suffered a further illness b-ecause of defendant's
treatment of that condition. It is a matte,r of common
knowledge that medical science has been trying to develop
a eure for arthritis for a period of years. Various treut-
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rnents have been tried with doubtful success. (See Exhibit·s G. H. I. & J.). As a result ·of these treatments, the
plaintiff claims to have suffered another ailment which ....
might h'ave ·been apoplexy, a blood clot, trauma or emboli
of the brain.
An· ordinary layman does not ordinarily know what
the conditions are much less the conditions' which may
bring them about or the manner in which they may be
treated. Appellant apparently recognizes this, but attempts to argue that the jury might infer negligence from
the fact that defendant experienced difficulty in n1aking
an injection into the vein of plain.tiff's left arm. Any
person who has ever given a blood transfusion knows that
the ability to make an insertion into the vein of different
p:ersons depends upon a number of variable factors such
as the depth of the vein, to cite only one .. Whether or not
defendant was negligent again is a matter of expert opinIon.
In Baxter v. Snow, 78 Utah 217, 2 P2d 257, which
is only quoted in part on page 53 of appellant's brief,
plaintiff went to a doctor for treatment of his left ear.
He testified that the! doctor inserted instruments in his
ear and nose and that he could hear when he sat down
' hear
in the doctor's chair for treatment, but could not
when he stood up. l-Ie ·produced no expert testimony on
the lack of care, or negligence of the doctor. A judgment
for plaintiff in the lower court was re~versed and the case
remanded for new trial. In so deciding, the court quoted ·
Wigmore on evidence, Vol. 4, ·sec. 2090 (2nd Ed) :
"It happens, however, that in one class of

8
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cases viz, actions for malpractice against a physician or surgeon, the main issue of the defendant's
use of suitable p-rofessional skill is generally
a topic calling for expert testimony only: and also
that the plaintiff in such an action often prefers
to rest his case on the n1ere facts of his sufferings,
and to rely upon the jury's untutored sympathies,
without attempting specifically to evidence the defendant's unskillfulness as the cause of those suf·ferings. Here the Courts have been obligated to
insist on the dictate of simple logic, resulting from
the principle above cited, ( citations) that expert
testimony on the main fact in issue must somewhere appear in ·the plaintiff's whole evidence:
and for lack of it the Court n1ay rule, in its general
po,ver to pass upon the sufficiency of evidence,
(citations) that there is not sufficient evidence to
go to the jury."
In Anderson vs. Nixon, 104 Utah 262, 139 P'2 216,
Plaintiff based a malpractice action on the failure of physician to recognize osteomylitis by specified date. A judgment for the plaintiff in the lower court was reversed. Th'3
court said:
"No expert testified that had DT. Nixon recog. nized the symptoms of osteomylitis, he could have
alleviated or cured it by using ordinary skill, care
and knowledge of a physician practicing in that
vicinity.... Osteornylitis being a disease the cause
and cure of which is peculiarly within the knowledge of medical men and not a matter of common
knowledge, it is necessary to have exp-ert testimony on the effect of the negligence of the doctor
·on the end result. In this case there was no evidence that anything Dr. Nixon did or failed to do
after osteomylitis developed caused the end result.
In the absence of such expert testimony there i3
9
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

nothing upon which a jury can base its finding
on the proximate cause of the injury. A jury may
not conjecture or speculate, but must have substantial evidence on which to base a verdict."
In Passey v. Budge, 85 Utah 37; 38 P (2) 712, where
a doctor broke 'a small piece of a surgical knife during a
tonsillectomy and permitted the particle to pass through
the intestinal tract, the court held that the plaintiff must
meet defendant's testimony that suc:h treatment was
proper with expert testimony to the contrary.
As was said in Baxter v. Snow, Supra, which was
reversed because no expert testimony was given, the court
did concede :
"A treatment may so plainly indicate that
the physician or surgeon wa;s negligent, or that
the act done or failed to be done so obviously did
not involve .skill, as not to require any opinion
of an expert as to· the performance or non-performance of the act."
Appellant cites examples of such cases in her brief:
Where. a chirop~ra.ctor fractured plaintiff's 12th rib while
tre'ating her-Morrison v. Lane, 52 P2 530. Where a
chiropractor roughly jerked plaintiff's head causing a
partial paralysis of the. hody-Furrah v. Patton, 59 P2d
76. And whe,re a chiropractor thrust his thumb between
the shoulder blades of a patient with such vio~ence as to
dislocate plaintiff's ribs-Hinthorn v. Garrison (Kan.)
196 P. 439.
The ca:se at bar does not involve any condition so
simple as dislocating a rib while tre~ating a patient or
leaving a sponge in an operation. It is submitted that the
10
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n1atters under consideration are so peculiarly within the
kno\Yledge of medicine that to permit the: jury to involve
their own conclusion 'vould be to allow them to indulge
in conjecture and specula;tion.
POINT NO. II. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF LACK OF
SKILL OR NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE DEFENDANT.

Appellant asserts that there were admissions of
defendant, Eason, and expert testimony. of injury to the
plaintiff to take the case to the jury without indicating
any evidence upon which he relies.
It has frequently been held by this court that the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, that negligence might be
inferred from the injury, does not apply ~o m·alpractice
actions and that negligence of defendant must be show:n
affirmatively, mere possibility of negligence: not being
sufficient. (Walkenhorst v. Kesler, 92 Utah 312, 67 P.
(2) 654) (Baxter v. Snow, sup·ra.) (Jackson v. Colston,
116 U. 299, 209 P 2d 566) In the case at bar there· is no
evidence that the diagnosis of the defendant, that is, that
plaintiff had arthritis, was incorrect. In fact the evidence
sustains this diagnosis. There wa:s no evidence that
the treatments given by the d~fendant were not the approved methods of treatment. T'he·re was no evide·nce
that any of the drugs or injections given should not have
heen given or ·that defendant did not take. adequate precautions to insure· that the substances. used in said injertions were not properly selected and prepared.
The cases cited by app·e·llant do not stand for the.
proposition that defendant does not have the~ burden of
11
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showing negligence, hut merely go to the degree: of proof
required. In James v. Robertson, 39 Utah 414, 117 p.
1068, the evidence was that plaintiff had gone to defendant to have a cist removed. The defendant had used a
caustic solution and may have dropped some in her eye
causing blindness. A doctor testified the injury to the·
eye could have been caused by the caustic solution or
some other foreign substance. There was no evidence of
any othe-r foreign substance getting into her eye. The
court held the jury might find from that evidence that
defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. In Peterson v. Richards., 73 Utah 59, 272
P. 229, plaintiff's evidence, coupled with admission of
defendant, was consistent with the· theory that defendant
had crushed plaintiff's. hand by manipulation. of an operating table. In J·a_ckson v. Colston, 11_6 Utah 299, 209
P2 566, the majority of the court held, contrary to J usti.ce
Wade and Justice Wolf, that the fac~ that plaintiff was
injured did not give rise to -a presumption that she w-as
injured by ·defendant in the absence~ of proof that defendant was negligent or that such negligence was the proximate cause of injury to plaintiff.
As has been pointed out there is no evidence of lack
of due care in defendant's diagnosis of plaintiff's condition or his method or manner of trea:ting the srune. Appellant assumes, without basis either in fact or in law,
that the diagnosis and treatment of the defendant were
unauthorized.
The practice of medicine is defined by statute Section 79-9-17, Utah Code Annotated 1943, as follows:

12
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

" . Any person who shall diagnose, treat or p~ro
fess to treat, or prescribe or advise, for, any physical or mental ailment of, or any physi,cal injury to,
or any deformity of, another: or \vho shall operate
upon another for any aihnent, injury or deforlnity, shall be regarded as practicing medicine or
treating hu1nan ailments."
There are four kinds of license to practice given in
the State of Utah (79-9-3, Utah Code Annotated 1943).
The following classes of license shall be issued:
(1) To practice n1edicine and surgery in all
branches thereof.

(2) (a) To practice as an osteopathic physician without operative surgery. in accordance
with the tenents of a p-rofessional school of osteopathy recognized by the department of registration.
(b) To practice as an osteopathic physician
and surgeon in accordance with the tenents of a
professional school of osteopathy recognized by
the department of registration.
· (3) · To practice the treatment of human ailn1ents without the use of drugs and without operative surgery....
(4)

To practice obstetrics.

The evidence shows that defendant had met all the
requirements necessary to· becoming an Osteopathic
Physician and Surgeon required by Secti~n 79-9-8, Utah
Code Annotated, including: graduation from high school,
2 years college wor~ at Santa Monica Junior .Colle~ge,
Santa Monica, California, four years resident work at

13
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the College of Naturopa;thic Physicians and Surgeons
at Los Angeles, from which he greduated with 5141 hours
of lectures and 'Class work, and in addition a course of
training in a hospital, or sanitarium, or office of a licensed Naturopathic Physician of the St~te of Utah
from December 1, 1942 to December 1, 1943. He had
taken the examination prescribed by the Department of
Registratio:n and has received a passing grade in all subjects including minor surgery (Exhibit 1).
There is no question that the defendant possessed
the necessary qualifications of an osteopathic physician
and surgeon and the witness for plaintiff so testified
(R. 63). He has been issued a license as a naturopathic
physician including obstetrics (R. 55). For some reason,
unexplained by the evidence, the Dep~~rtment of Re~gis
tration have held up insurance of licenses under S.ection ·
(2) (b) of Section 79-9-3 Utah Code Annotated 1943.
It should be noted that Section ( 2) of 79-9-3 does not
define on osteopath as one who treats without drugs or
surgery. Sec. (a) says without operative surgery, Section
(b) makes no limitation. The important part of the definition is the phrase "in accordance with the tenents of a
professional school of osteopathy recognized by the department of registration." As was s.aid in Sta:te v. Gleason, (Kan.) 79 P 2d 911, whe~re the court was called upon
to interpret a statute wherein a board was authorized to
issue a successful applicant "'a eertificate granting him
the right to practice osteopathy in the State of Kansas,
as taught and practiced in the legally incorporated colleges of osteopathy of good repute~."
14
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'V e have no difficulty in finding that our
legislature recognized the p.ractice of medicine and
surgeTy as one thing, and the practice of osteopathy as another, and that it regarded both
schools of healing as having merit, and the practice of each wa_s authorized. Although founded on
different basic ideas they seek to attain the same
objective,-namely, the curing or reducing the
injurious effects of diseases or injuries to mankind. The legislative purp-ose was to protect citizens of the state from those who would attempt to
acco1nplish such purposes by means which they
have not studied, or were otherwise unqualified
to use. As in other sc:hools of thought having a
common object in view, such a religion or political
science, while fundamental differences exist, there
may be ideas or practices in common. Professional men of high standing seldom have serious difficulty with such details. Our legislature dealt
with the two schools of healing in terms quite
general, and that is the vie-wpoint we take. It is
possible the classification made by the legislature
is sufficiently definite so that the detailed specifie questions present in the briefs, and others of
a similar character, can be answered, but if so
they partake more of questions of fact than of
pure questions of law."
H

In State v. Vvagner (Nebraska) 297 N.W. 906 it was
held under a statute ·conferring a right to p·ractice osteopathy in all its branches as taught in the _osteopathic
colleges recognized by the American Osteopathic Association that Osteopathic physicians are entitled to pe.rforin "surgery" under provisions of the <?·steopathic statute, if the surgery is confined to surgery as it was taught
and used as a part of the osteopathic system of healing,
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which is in the main by manipulation but are not entitled
to enter into the general field of operative surgery with
surgical instruments.
Thus it is seen that the authority of the defendant
to practice, medicine depends no!t on any neat distinction
between what does or does not constitut~ minor surgery
but is limited by and is to be judged by the fundamental
precep~ts of the sehool of praetice to which the practi.. tioner belongs or, in this case, the t~nents of a professional school of osteopathy recognized by the Departlnent of
Re~gistration. In.6rder for the jury or trial court to have
made or for this court to make a determination of
whether Qr not defendant's activities were authorized
these "Tenents" must be introduced into the record and
the record is absolutely silent upon this point.
·Moreover, even if we should assume any conduct
of the defendant was unauthorized we are still faced with
the sarue fundamental problem. As said in McKay· v.
.State~ Board of Exam1ners (Colo.) 86 P. 2d 232 :
"If a law inhibits the prescribing of a· drug
it is of course the duty of a physician to obey the
law and if convicted of its violation by a court of
comp~etent jurisdiction he might with perfect. propriety be held guilty of unprofessional or dishonorable conduct, if such violation is held also· to
involve moral turp itude even though the prescription might he entirely prope~r in a case judged by
medical standards alone. Treatment that is proper
by correct medical standards does not constitute
malpra<5tice e·ven though it amounts to a violation
of law. Malpractice consists of a failure to exercise that degree of care and skill in diagnosis or
1
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treatment that 1nay reasonably be expected fron1
one licensed and- holding himself out as a physician, under the circumstances of the p·articular
case."
Moreover, 've still have the question ·of proximate
cause,
HThe great weight of authority supports the
view that such failure to procure a license does not
in itself give rise to any right of recovery hut
only subjects the defendant to the penalty· prescribed by statute.... "
~'While

a failure to comply with the registration statute would subject the defendant to a criminal prosecution, such failure, coupled with a
showing of treatment given, is not in itself sufficient on which to base a charge of malpractice.
To maintain such an action, the plaintiff must
show that the result complained of was due to
negligence or unskillful· treatment.'' Willett v.
Rowekomp (Ohio) 16 N.E. 2d 457.
It is submitted that there was no evidence of any
negligent or unlawful act of the defendant in this treatment of plaintiff.
POINT NO. III. THERE IS NO SHOWING THAT THE
PLAINTIFF'S CONDITION WAS PROXIMATELY CAUSED
BY ANY ACT OR OMISSION OF DEFENDANT, NEGLIGENT
OR OTHERWISE.

The proposition that, "if injuries could b·e attributed
to two or more causes one of which was the negligence
of defendant, it would be a question for the jury to determine the proximate cause of the injury," is subject to
the qualification that there must be a causel connection
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between a negligent a:ct or omission complained of and
the resultant injury. In all of the pertinent cases cited
.by the ap.pellant it will be found that the· evidence showed
a negligent act and a subsequent injury, the later resulting. naturally and logically from the former.. A review
of a part of these citations will ill~strate this fact.
In Anderson v. Nixon (supra) the majority of the
court held that there was no evidence of negligence which
was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury.
In F~redrickson v. Maw (Utah) 227 P. 2d 772 the evidence supporte·d a finding that .defendant in p·erforming
a tonsillectomy left gauze in plaintiff's mouth which later
manifested itself in ulcers which formed in plaintiff's
mouth.
In Anderson v. Stump (Cal.), 109 Pa:c. 2d 1027, the
defendant made, a vaginal ~·xamination of plaintiff with
his street clothes on and the bed linen was ne~ither changed or sterilized. Later an infection develo~ed in the same
· ·area.
In Jordan v. Skinne~ (Wash.) 60 Pac. 2d 697 a doctor
failed to sterilize the eyes on a new horn baby of birth as
required by state laws and proper medical procedure.
Three days later an infection developed in the child's
eyes.
In the case of Jackson v. Colston, 116 Utah 29·5, 209
P. 2 566 plaintiff brought an aetion to recover for burns
to her leg allegedly due to heat treatments given by the
defendant. The evidence showed 'that the lamp used to
give the tre,atmerrt did not produce enough heat to burn
pl~intiff's leg. The court below directed a verdict in
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defendant's favor and this court affirmed the decision
saying : ( sylabus)
"'In an action for injuries arising out of analleged act or omission of the defendant, it is incumbent upon the plain tiff to prove, first, that the defendant \vas negligent and second tha:t the defend-·
ant's negligent acts or omissions p·roximately
caused the injury sustained by the plaintiff.
" ... the causal connection between the alleged
negligent act and the injury is never p~resumed
and that is a matter which must always be proved.
''The mere fact that plaintiff wa.s injured does
not raise a presumption or authorize an infere~nce
that the defendant's act or omissions proocimateiy
cause the injury." (See also Walkenhorst v. Kesler, 92 Utah 312, 67 P2 654; Anderson v. Nixon,
104 Utah 262, 139 P2 216; and 13 ALR 2d 24 to
the same effect.)
In her complaint appellant alleged that her injury
was due to the negligent inje'Ction of some fluid into her
body and more particularly that her injury was due to
some fluid which was injected on December 27, 1950:
"and that on numerous occasions between August
5, 1950 and December 28, 1950, the defendant and
his servants, employees and assistants did inject
various fluids, the nature of which is unknown
to the plaintiff, into the body of the plaintiff, and
that on December 27, 1950, the defendant, George
E. Eason, did. inject in to the plaintiff a liquid,
the nature of which is unknown to the plaintiff,
whereby the plaintiff had a convulsion with the result of a serebral vascular aecident."
It was also Dr. Day's opinion that plaintiff's condition was due to a soluble substance being injected into tha
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system of such a· nature that it could p·ass through the
veins or the lungs into the circulation system and eventually reach the brain. He testified it is possible that t 1il
in penicillin could reach the brain in such a manner.
· . There is no evidence in the record that penicilJ Jn
should not have been used in the· treatment of plaintiff's
arthritis. There is no evidence that any of the penicillin
which was injected contained oil or, ~ven assuming that
it eontained oil, that the· penicillin was pre·pared and
injected in such a manner that oil might have been introduced into it or the p·resence of oil discovered. F·or aught
that ap·p~ears in the reeo.rd, pencillin may often he present
in penicillin injections even when due care is used i~ the
pre·pa.ration, procuring or injection of.the same.
·Likewise there is no eyidence that any other fluid
which was injected into plaintiff's body should not have
been used in the treatment of plaintiff or that the injection were prepared or injected in such a manner as to
cause some soluble substance to be injected into plaintiff's
body which should either not have been injected or should
have been discovered in an injection.
During the past few ye·ars. medical science has developed a number of "wonder drugs" with great benefit
to the physical well being of mankind. It is a matter of
common knowledge that the ·use of the drugs are still in
what may ·be terminated "somewhat of an experimental
stage" and that the use· of these drugs quite often produce
a differe~t rea:ction than expected depending upon the individual. It may he that pl·aintiff's illness was a reaction
from one of these medicants. We cannot say that the
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use of these preparations is, ipso facto, negligent in the
absence of any evidence as to the wisdom of using them
or some negligence in the Inanner in which they are handled.
nforeover, there is no evidence· as to any other affliction, other tha:n arthritis, 'vhich the plaintiff may or may
not haYe had, such as hypotension. It may be that plaintiff did suffer from one of the other ailments suggested
by Dr. D·ay such as apoplexy. He·r activities up to the
tllne of her illness are not explained. It may be that if we
lmew these activities we could explain the convulsion she.
suffered on January 2, 1951, five days after her last treatment in the hands of the defendant. We realize the foregoing conclusions are. highly conjectural and speculative
but submit that they are as likely as any other conclusion which may_ be drawn on the basis of the evidence
submitted.
Appell:ant, ap·parently·.aware o~ the failure of the
evidence to show defendant to he. negligent in injecting
any fluid in plaintiff's body, continually refers to the
occasion when Dr. Eason had difficulty in making an
injection in plaintiff's left arm -as some e·vidence of negligence. This argument is falacious in a number of respects.
The action was brought to recover for a cerebral vaseula.r accident, an injury to plaintiff's brain, not for any
injury to plaintiff's arm. The plaintiff alleged an.d he:r
Doctor asserted her injury was the result of some fluid
being injected into her body and more. particularly some
fluid which was injected on December 27 1950. There
.

'
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is no causal connection. between her injury and the fact
that defendant some month and a half before was unable
to make an injection into the left arm and thereafter
was compelled to make injections into the right arm.
Moreover, there was no showing that the defendant
was negligent in the manner in which he tried to make
the injection and plain tiff herself testified any injury
to the arm healed within two weeks, a rnonth before she
suffered the injury of which she now complains.
An examination of the record in this case leaves the
reader with the question. What caused the plaintiff
to become so violently ill on January 2, five days afte·r
she had l~ast seen the defendant~ The answer to that
question is not. to he found in the evidence adduced at
the trial. To have submitted that question to the jury
would have been permitted them to indulge in mere conjecture and speculation and any conclusion reached would
have, been pure guess.
POINT NO. IV. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN SUSTAINING ANY OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S QUESTIONS.

The plain tiff asked Dr. Day:
Q. "Now, based upon that particular observation which you made on January 2, 1951, do you
have an opinion as to whether or not the evidence
of injections which you there observed was made
in a careful and skillful manner of the type of
the school of medicine which was then in practice
in Salt Lake City, Utah~"
He was then asked what that opinion was and the
question was objected to on the grounds that there was
no foundation la:id; that there was no allegation in the
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complaint that plaintiff's condition was due to the manne-r
of making injections but alleged that her condition was
the result of fluids being injected into her body; that
there was no evidence that plaintiff's condition was due
to the manner of 1naking an injection but that p;Jaintiff's
own doctor had already testified that it was a rHsult of
some fluid, oil in penicillin, having been injected; and
lastly, upon the grolmd that plaintiff was attempting
to change the theory of her case.
"It is fundamental that evidence to be admissible must relate and be confined to the matters in
issue in the case at bar and must tend to prove or
disprove these matters or be pertinent thereto, or,
to put it another \vay, the proof must correspond
to the issues raised by the pleadings. . . . The
reason for the rule is that such evidence tends to
dra-\v the minds of the jurors away from the point
in issue and mislead them; moreover, the adverse
party having no notice of such coarse of evidence
is not prepared to rebut it." 20 American Jurisprudence, page 242.
The theory on which the case at bar wa.s tried was
that plaintiff's illness had been caused by the negligent
injection of some fluid which should not have been injected. This witness had already testified that pJaintiff's
illness, in his opinion, was due to the injection of some
substance such as oil. Whether or not the injection was
1nade in a physically skillful manner was not probative
of the ulti1nate issue, that is, that defendant negligently
injected some fluid which caused plaintiff's illness, and
the information called for was clearly not relevant.
Moreover, the question was not p~roperly framed in
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that the court and the jury were not informed upon what
facts the witness was basing his opinion so that they
may be in a pos1tion to determine, from the other evidence, what weight should he given to his testimony.
"When a party seeks to have the opinion of
an expert witness on the whole or any part of the
evidence, i't is the duty of the court in the exercise
of its discretion so to control the form, length, and
contents of the question that the-re may be no
abuse of the right to take the witness' opinion. A
hypothetical question should be p·rop~erly framed,
sufficiently specific, and clearly stated so that
the .jury.may know With certainty upon what state
of ass.wned facts the exp·ert bases his opinion."
58 American Juris prudence (Witnesses) page 482.
The witness had already testified in detail as to his
observations of plaintiff's condition; his review of the
history 'Of the case, including the manner in which his
injections were made; the treatment given and pJaintiff's ·response.. His opinion was already before the court
and it affirmatively appeared that the manner in which
the injections ~ere ma.de did not enter into his opinion or
have any causal connection with plaintiff's subsequent
illness. ·The court, therefore, properly, excluded this evidence on this ground.
"The extent to which the direct examination
of an expert witness may he carried is largely dis-cretionary with the trial court. Questions as to
matters which have pro~perly been brought out in
prior testimony of the witness may be excluded."
58 American Jurisprudence (Witnesses), page
469.
In Davis v. United States, 165 U.S.. 373, a doctor
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who had stated all that he had seen and heard and had
given his own expert opinion concerning the s·anity of a
person 'vas asked what medical science taught on a ce.r- ·
tain symptoms which the evidence showed we·re p~resent
in the person concerning which the doctor was testifying.
An objection was sustained and the sup;reme court said:

"rt would seem probably that, inasmuch as the
Witness had shown himself qualified t.o testify
as a medieal expert, as he had stated all that he
had seen and heard, and given his own expe·rt
opinion thereof, the court deen1ed it improper or
unnecessary to enter into any examination as to
what the witness thought medical science would
say of defendant's conduct and ap~pearance. It
1nay have been because the matter had been sufficiently brought out in the prior testimony of the
witness, but probably the reason we have suggested is the correct one, and in that view we are
of the opinion that the ruling furnishes no ground
for disturbing the judgment."
The immateriality of the p·roffered evidence and
the fact that the exclusion of the same was not prejudicial
is. best illustrated by assuming an answer favorable for
the plaintiff. If we assume that the doctor would have
testified that defendant did not make the injection in
the skillful manner of the type of the school of medicine
which was then in practice in Salt Lake City, this evidence does not add anything to plaintiff's case since
there is absolutely no e:vidence that the manner in which
the injections were made caused. the illness complained
of by the plaintiff.
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. CONCLU1SION

It is submitted that there is no evidence·of negligence
on the part of defendant in the diagnosis or treatment of
pJaintiff. Assuming negligence in some respect, there is
no causal connection between any act or omission of the
defendant and the convulsions pilaintiff suffered on January 2, 1952.
An inference is made that defendant was not qualified to treat the plaintiff whereas the record shows that
he had graudated from Junior College, a four year n1edical. school for osteopathic physicians and had had one
year's practical experience before being allowed to enter
into p~ractice. It is inferred that the treatment prescribed
by the defendant was errop.eous and not in accord with
prescribed medical treatment, but the only evidence in thr
record is that the treatment was correct.
Plain tiff alleged in his complaint and tried the case
on the theory that defendant had negligently injected
some fluid into plaintiff's body. F'ailing to prove any
such negligence, appellant attempts to change the theory
of her case and argue that p·laintiff's injuries were due
to negligence in the manner in which defendant made the
injections, a theor:y which was not substantiated by the
opinion of her own expert witness and which has no
causal connection with the injury of which she complained.
The basis of Dr. Day's opinion is that some soluble
substance, such as oil, which could p·ass through the veins
and into the lungs and thence into the circulatory syste1n,
was injected into the pJaintiff. This precludes the physi-
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cal manner of making injections as a p·roxima.te_cause of
the injuries. Any infection as a result of an unsterile
needle would have appeared as an infection in the area
where the injection was n1ade. No such infection ap·peared.
Moreover, the injection on which the appellant places
so much stress occurred on November 6, 1951 57 days before the convulsion which is the injury for which recovery
is sought and not the arm-occurred. Its remoteness in
time alone precludes it from being a cause. And there
is no evidence that any injections were ever made in that
arm thereafter. Plaintiff herself testified that the arm
healed in two weeks and that injections were thereafter
made into the other arm and that the doctor exp-erienced
no further difficulty.
·I

There was no evidence that defendant ever made an
injection into the "manipulated arm" after N oiVember 6,
1950. As pointed out, plaintiff testified defendant did
not. Therefore, any evidence as to whether it was good
medical :P·ractice or not would have been immaterial and
the exclusion of this evidence was proper, esp~ecially in
view of the forn1 in which it was presented.
Respectfully submitted,
STEWART, CANNON & HANSON
By:
REx J. HANSON
EDWIN

B.

CANNON

DoN J. HANSON
ERNEST

F.

BALDWIN, JR.
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